Dr Mehmood Ul Hassan Khan
President: The Center for Knowledge and Public Policy
Regional Expert: China, CPEC, BRI & World Affairs
E-mail: mehmoodulhassankhan7@gmail.com / mehmoodulhassankhan7@gmail.com
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) stands as a transformative strategic asset and economic lifeline for Pakistan, embodying the culmination of 75 years of diplomatic relations of ironclad friendship between two sovereign nations.Despite this reality, a troubling narrative has emerged one propagated by self-styled “experts,” retired bureaucrats, sponsored pseudo-intellectuals, and notably, former FBR Chairman Shabbar Zaidi and former bureaucrate Mr. Akram Naeem Bharoka that seeks to misrepresent CPEC’s agreements, loans, projects, and policies as inimical to Pakistan’s national interests. This rebuttal systematically dismantles such fallacious arguments through rigorous application of international relations theory, economic doctrine, and strategic analysis.
According to Keohane & Nye, (1977) experts of liberal institutionalism international cooperation flourishes when states create institutions that reduce transaction costs, enhance information flows, and create reciprocal obligations. CPEC represents precisely such an institutional framework a bilateral mechanism that has operationalized the complex interdependence between Pakistan and China through multiple channels: trade, investment, infrastructure, and people-to-people contacts.
The critics’ arguments fundamentally misunderstand that CPEC is not merely a transactional arrangement but an institutionalized partnership that creates absolute gains for both parties, rather than the zero-sum relative gains calculus they erroneously apply.
Moreover, Keohane (1984) rightly demonstrated, in iterated games of international cooperation, states develop reputations for reliability and reciprocity precisely what characterizes the Pak-China relationship since 1951.
Haas, (1958) “Neo-functionalism” rightly highlights that integration in one sector creates spillover effects, generating demand for integration in adjacent sectors. CPEC exemplifies this phenomenon: what began as infrastructure investment has catalyzed cooperation in energy, telecommunications, industrial parks, agriculture, and maritime security. The spillover effect has extended to defense production (JF-17 Thunder, Al-Khalid tanks), naval cooperation (Type 054A/P frigates, Hangor-class submarines), and space collaboration sectors that critics conveniently ignore while cherry-picking isolated concerns.
Obviously, the Stephen Walt’s Balance of Threat theory (1987) provides crucial insight: states form alliances not merely to balance power but to balance threats. Pakistan’s strategic partnership with China represents a rational response to the threat perception emanating from India’s hegemonic ambitions, manifested in the “Gang of Four” doctrine RAW Chief Ravi Sinha, NSA Ajit Doval, and their associates who have systematically pursued policies aimed at Pakistan’s strategic encirclement. The Operation Bunyan Marsoos response demonstrates Pakistan’s resolve, backed by credible Chinese-origin capabilities, to counter such threats.
It is pertinent to mention that the so-called “debt trap diplomacy” thesis, schemed by Brahma Chellaney (2017) and propagated by Western media, has been comprehensively refuted by empirical scholarship. Deborah Brautigam (Johns Hopkins SAIS), SBP, SECP, Pakistan Planning Commission, economic & finance ministries have confirmed that Chinese lending constitutes a small fraction of Pakistan’s external debt approximately 20-25 percent with the majority owed to multilateral institutions (IMF, World Bank, ADB) and Paris Club creditors.
Ironically, Mr. Bharoka’s selective citation of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reports reveals either intellectual dishonesty or profound ignorance of defense economics. SIPRI data tracks arms transfers, not economic dependence. Military cooperation operates on fundamentally different principles.
Surely, the Heckscher-Ohlin’s Factor Endowments Theory also explains the complementary nature of Pak-China economic relations. China possesses capital, technology, and manufacturing expertise; Pakistan offers strategic location, labor, and natural resources. CPEC operationalizes this complementarity through: energy projects (coal, hydro, solar, wind) addressing Pakistan’s chronic power deficit a binding constraint on industrial growth, infrastructure corridors (roads, railways, ports) reducing logistics costs and enhancing connectivity and special economic zones (SEZs) creating platforms for technology transfer and industrial.
Interestingly, upgrading of the Krugman (1991) New Economic Geography framework explains that such infrastructure investments create agglomeration economies, attracting further investment and generating positive externalities. Gwadar Port, the crown jewel of CPEC, exemplifies this potential transforming Pakistan into a transshipment hub connecting Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East.
Keynesian multiplier theory demonstrates that infrastructure investment generates cascading economic benefits. Chinese investment in CPEC exceeding 62 billion in planned investments has created: direct employment for over 75,000 Pakistani workers, indirect employment in supply chains, services, and ancillary industries, enhanced productive capacity through energy and transport infrastructure and fiscal space through increased tax revenues and reduced subsidies.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that CPEC could add 2-2.5 percentage to Pakistan’s GDP a transformative impact for a country facing structural economic challenges.
Surely, the structural realism (Waltz, 1979) acknowledges that states operate in an anarchic system, necessitating self-help strategies. Pakistan’s defense cooperation with China represents a rational response to regional power asymmetries and the security dilemma exacerbated by India’s military modernization (Rafale acquisition, S-400 systems, and nuclear triad development).
Many other scholars like Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism (2001) would also interpret India’s hegemonic aspirations in South Asia as inherently threatening, justifying Pakistan’s counterbalancing strategy. The China-Pakistan axis serves as a balancing coalition against Indian regional dominance a classic application of balance of power theory.
Hedley Bull’s English School emphasizes the role of shared norms, institutions, and values in shaping international order and Pak-China relations exemplify a sustained strategic cooperation.
Interestingly, China maintains sovereign equality and mutual respect and has never interfered in Pakistan’s internal affairs. It always observed non-aggression and peaceful resolution of disputes, reciprocity in economic and security cooperation and last but not least, community of interests in regional stability and development.
The China-Pakistan Community with a Shared Future concept, endorsed at the highest levels, represents the institutionalization of these sustained strategic principles a stark contrast to the transactional, conditional relationships Pakistan has experienced with Western powers.
On the other hand, the Constructivist Theory (Wendt, 1992) emphasizes how shared identities and norms shape state behavior. The “ironclad friendship” between Pakistan and China is not merely a strategic convenience but a socially constructed reality rooted in: historical solidarity (China’s support during 1965 and 1971 wars), mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, shared developmental aspirations and last but not least, people-to-people bonds cultivated over 75 years.
Sandler & Hartley (1995), dealing with defense economics recognizes that military cooperation operates on principles distinct from commercial transactions because it provides non-excludable, non-rivalrous security benefits, joint production achieves economies of scale and scope, enhances indigenous capabilities and reduces dependence and demonstrates resolve and credibility to adversaries.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data cited by critics measures arms transfers, not the full spectrum of defense cooperation which includes joint exercises, training, intelligence sharing, and technology co-development. The SIPRI methodology explicitly acknowledges these limitations.
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s theory of sea power (1890) emphasized naval dominance as the key to national greatness. Pakistan’s naval modernization, supported by China, reflects this understanding:
Type 054A/P Frigates: Multi-role warships enhancing Pakistan Navy’s blue-water capabilities, Hangor-class Submarines: Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) equipped vessels providing extended submerged endurance and strategic deterrence, Sea Guardian Exercises: Bilateral naval drills enhancing interoperability and AMAN Series: Multinational exercises positioning Pakistan as a maritime security provider.
Admiral Naveed Ashraf’s statement that Hangor-class submarines will play a “key role in deterrence and securing sea lines of communication” reflects sound maritime strategy protecting Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), countering sea-denial threats, and ensuring freedom of navigation in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean Region.
Giulio Douhet’s theory of air power (1921) and John Warden’s Five Rings model (1988) inform Pakistan Air Force’s modernization. The qualitative edge provided by Chinese-origin platforms enhances deterrence stability in South Asia a stabilizing factor that critics ignore. Nuclear deterrence theory also (Scheinman, 1966) recognizes that conventional capability gaps can incentivize nuclear escalation; Chinese platforms help bridge this gap, reducing escalation risks.
Andrew Krepinevich’s concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (1993) provides an ideal opportunity for the Pak-China cooperation which must now extend to: electromagnetic spectrum operations, satellite jamming and counter-space capabilities, robotic combat systems, AI-enabled decision support, cyber warfare, nuclear-powered drones and 6G communications.
These domains represent the future of warfare and Pakistan’s partnership with China provides access to cutting-edge technologies that would be unavailable from Western sources due to export controls and political conditionality.
Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power (1990) emphasizes attraction over coercion. China’s approach to Pakistan exemplifies soft power: No political conditionality: Unlike Western lenders, China does not impose governance or human rights conditions, respect for sovereignty: China has never interfered in Pakistan’s domestic affairs, people-centered diplomacy: focus on tangible benefits for ordinary citizens and last but not least, cultural exchanges: educational scholarships, cultural events, language programs.
Definitely, the Pew Research Center and Gallup Pakistan surveys consistently show overwhelming public support for Pak-China relations a testament to the success of this soft power approach.
China Africa Join Hands for Strategic Partnership – by Tazeen Akhtar
The journalists and intellectuals cited in the original article represent counter-public diplomacy efforts. Their narratives follow predictable patterns: emphasizing debt concerns, questioning project viability, and alleging hidden agendas all refuted by empirical evidence.
The “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership” between Pakistan and China represents a unique diplomatic construct. This relationship embodies “special and privileged” partnership a category that transcends traditional alliance frameworks.
The writer submits that the Chinese loans constitute approximately 20-25% of Pakistan’s external debt not the dominant share claimed. Interest rates are concessional (2-3%) compared to commercial lending (6-8%) and grace periods of 5-7 years and maturity periods of 20-25 years provide fiscal space.
The writer pinpoints that agreements are publicly available on the CPEC Authority website and Ministry of Planning portals. Terms are negotiated, not imposed Pakistan’s sovereignty is fully respected and Joint Working Groups ensure Pakistani input into project design and implementation. Comparative analysis shows CPEC terms are more favorable than Western alternatives (e.g., IMF conditionality)
The writer suggest that the policy makers of both countries should further expand CPEC beyond infrastructure to agriculture, technology, and services and develop Special Economic Zones with focus on export-oriented industries, promote joint ventures in renewable energy, electric vehicles, and digital economy and further enhance human capital development through educational exchanges and vocational training.
In summary, the Pak-China relationship, anchored in CPEC and reinforced by comprehensive military cooperation, represents a strategic partnership that defies simplistic economic calculus or narrow security concerns. It embodies: liberal institutionalism’s vision of cooperative international order, realism’s recognition of power dynamics and security imperatives, constructivism’s emphasis on shared identity and norms, neo-functionalism’s logic of spillover and integration and defense economics’ principles of alliance efficiency and technology transfer.
Mr. Akram Naeem Bharoka and many other V-loggers, influencers characterized by misinterpretation, selective citation, and borrowed wisdom, fail to grasp these multidimensional realities. His narrative serves not Pakistan’s interests but those of external actors seeking to drive a wedge between “iron brothers.”
The 75th anniversary of Pak-China diplomatic relations is not merely a celebration of longevity but a reaffirmation of a shared future a future in which both nations prosper together, secure in their sovereignty, and confident in their partnership.
As President Asif Ali Zardari’s attendance at the PNS/M Hangor commissioning ceremony symbolizes, this relationship is generational built not for transient advantage but for enduring benefit. The puppetry journalists, sponsored pseudo-intellectuals, and retired bureaucrats who seek to undermine it will be remembered not as patriots but as useful idiots for forces that wish Pakistan ill.
The consensus among the Pakistani people across all segments of society is clear: China is a trusted friend, CPEC is a transformative opportunity, and the Pak-China partnership is vital, permanent, positive, productive, and participatory.
This is not mere rhetoric; it is the empirical reality confirmed by: trade data showing China as Pakistan’s largest trading partner, investment data showing China as Pakistan’s largest source of FDI, public opinion surveys showing overwhelming support for Pak-China relations and last but not least, strategic outcomes demonstrating enhanced security and development.
The critics may continue their “blame game,” but the arc of history bends toward cooperation, development, and shared prosperity. Pakistan and China, together, are writing a new chapter in international relations one that future generations will study as a model of enduring friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation.
